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Postnational Constitutionalism and the Challenge of Contested Multilateralism  
 
Neil Walker  
 
 
Julia Morse and Robert Keohane’s recently minted idea of ‘contested multilateralism’ (Morse 
and Keohane, 2014) is not directly addressed to those interested in the kind of theory and 
practice of constitutionalism beyond the state (‘postnational constitutionalism’ for short)   that  
the journal Global Constitutionalism has made its mission to map and encourage. Yet contested 
multiculturalism deserves the close attention of this journal’s readers and contributors for 
providing a novel account of the dynamics of growth in precisely the kinds of international and 
transnational institutions that they have sought to conceptualise in constitutional terms. It is my 
argument that, through this novel account, contested multilateralism offers both a serious 
challenge and qualified encouragement to postnational constitutionalism, and that we only 
appreciate the full value of its approach if we hold both of these perspectives – critical and 
constructive - together.  
1. The trend towards contested multilateralism 
Let me begin my discussion by looking at the kind of concept ‘contested multilateralism’ is, 
and noting its strengths and weaknesses.  As defined by Morse and Keohane, contested 
multilateralism offers a capsule description of the situation that occurs when national and 
transnational actors use new or existing multilateral institutions to challenge those rules, 
practices or aims of other existing multilateral institutions with which they are dissatisfied. 
Contested multilateralism, at least in its early form, is not the host of a well-developed 
explanatory, predictive or normative theory. It describes what the authors understand to be an 
intensifying contemporary trend, but we are not offered any accompanying general analysis of 
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what has caused that trend, or of where that trend is likely to take us in the long run. Neither 
does the elaboration of the concept involve a claim that the trend is categorically - or even 
predominantly - a welcome or an unwelcome one according to the standards by which we 
should evaluate global governance. 
In fact, the trend embraces such a wide range of phenomena that it would be difficult 
to envisage its being the kind of thing that is even amenable to a single such general 
explanation, or set of projections, or framework of evaluation. Contested multilateralism covers 
both  the development of new institutions to challenge the institutional status quo  - what the 
authors call ‘competitive regime creation’ – and the switch of focus by a coalition of actors to 
an  alternative  multilateral forum – what the authors call ‘regime shifting’. It also covers a 
wide diversity of issue areas, from intellectual property to renewable energy, health and 
international security. It has different generative sources, both state-based and internationa l 
institution-based. And   it is brought to fruition through different sites and actors, from 
international legal conventions and formal organisations to informal networks, including civil 
society organisations and coalitions.  
So the trend with which Morse and Keohane are concerned is a broad and diverse one, 
and that very breadth and diversity offers disadvantage as well as advantage. The disadvantage, 
as already indicated, lies in the absence of any core or paradigm case that might provide the 
basis of a robust explanatory or evaluative theory. The advantage lies in the discerning capture 
of so many different developments under one very general tendency. And while there may be 
no close investigation of deep causes, the authors do suggest here, and develop more explicit ly 
in other writings, (see e.g. de Burca, Keohane and Sabel, 2013) that the trend towards contested 
multilateralism both tracks and reinforces a broad drift away from the hegemony of the 
sectorally integrated regimes that grew up alongside the UN in the early post-war period, such 
as the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Health Organisation. The relative success of 
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these integrated regimes owed much to the dominant position of certain leading states, or state 
coalitions, and their projected commitment to providing a coherent response to clearly specified 
problems of global collective action. However, as the number of issue areas in which global 
public goods have become visible on the international political radar has multiplied, and as 
their complexity has deepened, the limitation of this kind of linear, settled, state-delegation 
model has become more exposed - a challenge reinforced by the amplification of the voice of 
the global South in the UN and other planetary political settings and their willingness to 
articulate different preferences to rich Northern powers. The arrested development of major 
integrated global initiatives of the last 20 years, from the failure of the WTO’s Doha 
Development Round, to the halting ratification and implementation of the Rio Convention on 
Climate Change and  the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court,  shows 
an increasing failure to deliver - or even when delivered to consolidate - grand settlement across 
significant interest divisions and across the broader set of sovereign states who assert a 
significant stake in these developments.  
Instead, as Morse and Keohane’s instructive case studies indicate, the response to 
increased global interdependence in contentious policy areas has been the upsetting of settled 
institutional hierarchies and their replacement by less coherent and more heterarchical regime 
complexes. In arenas as diverse as the GATT/WTO challenge to the World Intellectua l 
Property Organisation over patent protection, the EU’s opposition to the UN Security Council’s 
system for sanctioning terrorist finance, the launch of the International  Renewable Energy 
Association to outflank the International Energy Agency on the development of renewable 
energies, and the emergence of a coalition of non-state organisations to rival the WHO on 
questions on vaccination and  to pursue a more holistic socio-economic conception of global 
health, we observe the institutional proliferation through competition that lies at the heart of 
contested multilateralism. This is a process, moreover, that builds on itself. As institutiona l 
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density and overlap increases due to contestation, this provides scope for further contestation 
and new forms of institutional elaboration, and so on in an ever-intensifying flow.    
2. Postnational constitutionalism in question 
If contested multilateralism is a concept already widely drawn, postnational constitutiona lism 
inhabits decidedly more open-ended terrain. All that unites the variety of different conceptions 
of postnational constitutionalism is subscription to two very broad claims. One claim is 
normative, holding that   constitutionally valuable processes and outcomes are conceivable 
beyond the state, and so our contemplation of the prospect of such valuable processes and 
outcomes should not be confined to the state. The other claim is empirical, holding that the 
exercise of effective constitutional authority is not in fact restricted to states and state 
institutions. The two claims are normally run together by their proponents against the insistence 
of postnational constitutional sceptics that constitutional authority both should be and is a 
matter for sovereign states alone.  
Yet within this twin-track approach, there are differences. Some conceptions of 
postnational constitutionalism, as we shall see, accord an explicit priority to the normative 
claim  – what ought to be rather than what is –  and track the latter only in terms of the former, 
whereas other conceptions more readily concede the empirical as their point of departure. Both 
orientations respond in different ways to an abiding difficulty in connecting the ideal to the 
actual in transnational constitutional thought. Those who emphasise the ideal over the actual 
may be concerned about the limitations of existing transnational constitutional arrangements, 
and keen to look beyond these to more hopeful signs or emergent trends. Those who begin 
from the actual, by contrast, tend to be wary of the lack of grounding of certain of the stronger 
normative claims for postnational constitutionalism in current international power relations. 
But this also reveals an ideological preference – a pragmatic acceptance of ‘non-ideal’ 
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constitutional circumstances as they are and a commitment to making the best of them.  All 
postnational constitutionalists, then, remain concerned in one way or another with the 
assessment and attainment of what is constitutionally valuable, and in achieving, from one 
direction or the other, some kind of reconciliation between the ideal and the actual. But the 
tensions involved in reaching for this accommodation are never far from the surface    
We better understand how these tensions are differently perceived and addressed, and 
we better appreciate the sheer range of positions that can be accommodated under a thin state-
decentring consensus, if we focus upon the divergent viewpoints amongst postnationa l 
constitutionalists in their prior assessment of what may be defined as constitutional.  This is an 
assessment that typically blends inquiry into etymological roots and historical usage with deep 
assumptions about the proper nature of any constitutional project - and therefore, over what 
counts as a relevant empirical instance or an appropriate articulation of postnationa l 
constitutionalism. The deep differences that emerge over this prior conceptual question allow 
us to identify three broad strands of global constitutionalism. 
 First, we find versions of global or transnational constitutionalism which, following the 
long tradition of reference to a discrete ‘constituted’ object of self-government, stress 
singularity of normative order, architectural integrity and the existence of some kind of 
integrated transnational or global constitutional system, however rudimentary. Secondly, there 
is a plural conception of transnational constitutional thought and practice, where the emphasis 
is on sector-specific self-governing regimes with quite different constitutive dynamics and 
regulatory forms. Here the emphasis is again on the particularity of the constituted object. But 
in marked contrast to the first approach, this world of postnational constitutionalism, just like 
the world of national constitutionalism that preceded it and continues to exist alongside it, is 
conceived of as a highly segmented and differentiated arrangement of largely self-conta ined 
functional or territorial units. Alongside these two approaches we find, finally, a stream of 
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transnational constitutionalism focused not on the detail of actually existing structures but on 
the development of common constitutional values, principles or mechanisms bearing upon 
governing capacity or constraint, and in a manner that – in accordance with another aspect of 
the older constitutional tradition - is general or universal in ambition, and so trans-institutiona l 
and polity-indifferent.  
There is no space here to examine these three strands – postnational constitutiona lism 
as singularity, plurality or commonality  - in any depth (Walker, 2015, ch.3). Yet each has 
certain salient characteristics, which, as we shall see, are challenged by the view of 
transnational governance offered by contested multilateralism. Adapting the pyramida l 
structure of national constitutionalism to the global domain, postnational constitutionalism as 
singularity tends to be organized around the commanding heights of the UN Charter and 
institutions.  In addition, the notion of an ‘international community’ figures prominently in this 
drama, with the San Francisco conference which drafted the Charter cast as a kind of 
constitutional convention in which that international community is mobilized and crystallized 
as a global constituent power – ‘We The Peoples of the United Nations’ (Fassbender, 2008). A 
more elaborate and expansive version of the singular approach to postnationa l 
constitutionalism has also gained some support.  This places less store by the functiona l 
capacity of the UN and places greater emphasis on its role as an authoritative ‘connecting 
factor’ (De Wet, 20012; 1224) within a more broadly inclusive framework of international law.    
If we continue along this spectrum, we arrive at the alternative model of postnationa l 
constitutionalism as plurality. Here attention is focused upon the global spread of  ‘sectoral 
constitutionalisation’ (Peters, 2009), with particular reference to the structural similarity and 
cross-cloning of the hybrid ‘treaty-constitutions’  (Jackson, 2010) of  special internationa l 
organisations or regimes such as the International Labour Organization, the WTO or the 
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uniquely well-developed case of the EU. And at the very extreme of this continuum, we find a 
conception of ‘societal constitutionalism’ (Teubner, 2012) in which the division of the world 
into a multiplicity of functional regimes is even more pronounced. This characterization has 
less to do with formal juridical attributes (constitutions, treaties, appellate courts, etc.) and more 
to do with how law bends, mutates and blends in various ways (through industry codes, 
performance indicators, rating agencies, hybrid private/public representative institutions, 
arbitration and mediation  forums, etc.,)     with the distinctive operating logic of different ly 
constituted transnational social fields – the economy, sport, the arts, education, science, 
communications media etc. 
Postnational constitutionalism as commonality finds the essence of constitutiona lism 
not in the workings of particular governance institutions, whether in a centralized hierarchy or 
in a more baroque pattern, but in the articulation of certain key norms both across, and - in the 
context of ‘pluralist’ exchanges - between different constitutional sites, (see e.g. Walker, 2002). 
These common norms may assume the status of formal doctrine, however precariously 
institutionalized, as in the general principles of international law; or as in the case of  ius cogens 
prohibitions of aggressive war, genocide, piracy, slavery, torture or apartheid, and affirmations 
of the right to national self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Yet some versions of the common principles approach place as much if not more stress on 
informal or implicit common standards of good governance, such as legality, subsidiar ity, 
adequate participation and accountability, public reason and the protection of fundamenta l 
rights, and on how these are affirmed, developed and reinforced in circulation between different 
constitutional sites –national and transnational (see e.g. Kumm, 2009). 
The three strands of postnational constitutionalism are by no means mutually exclusive. 
It is possible to note the importance of the UN, reinforced in a post-Cold War climate of the 
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partial collectivization of global security enforcement, while also registering the broader trend 
to differentiation and specialization in the rise of sectoral constitutionalism at non-state sites. 
And it is possible to acknowledge both of these  trends towards institutional empowerment 
while also appreciating a trend towards the articulation of common norms across institut ions  
and a more conscious  and confident practice of cross-site borrowing, learning and 
endorsement. Each strand can be seen as part of a cumulative movement away from a state-  
centred constitutionalism as much as it can a force at variance with the others. 
 Yet this should not blind us to the real tensions both within and across the three strands. 
Each strand, as intimated earlier, struggles with the gap between the actual and the ideal – 
between fact and norm. Both constitutionalism as singularity and constitutionalism as plurality 
tend to start from existing institutional patterns and to provide such rationalisations and 
justifications of these patterns as they can. Constitutionalism as commonality and aspiration 
towards generality is more likely to start from the ideal and look for its instantiation, however 
partial, in doctrine and practice. 
 We also find discordance between the visions of singularity and pluralism. Regiona l 
government in the EU can clash with global governance at the UN. The operational ambitions 
of NATO or other coalitions of the willing are often at odds with what is possible, or not 
possible, in the UN Security Council. The regime of economic governance of the WTO sits 
uneasily with the UN’s broader development goals. In turn, the fragmentary impulse we find 
in constitutionalism as plurality is also in tension with at least some versions of 
constitutionalism as commonality. The longstanding debate over unity versus fragmentation in 
international law, for example, which has been joined in such key settings as the Internationa l 
Law Commission, (2006) concerns precisely whether some kind of general normative order 
can hold the centre against the pull towards self-regulating and self-contained regimes 
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3. The Challenge of Contested Multilateralism 
How, if at all, can Morse and Keohane’s contested multilateralism aid us in coming to terms 
with the weaknesses and strengths of the postnational constitutional approach? It can do so, I 
contend, both by challenging the empirical credentials of much that passes under the banner of 
postnational constitutionalism, and, on the basis of that challenge, suggesting how postnationa l 
constitutionalism might find a better accommodation between the factual and the normative.  
To begin with, the argument from contested multilateralism helps us appreciate that, 
whatever else it is, postnational constitutionalism is often just bad social science. Postnationa l 
constitutionalists put at the centre of their institutional accounts a concept whose meaning is 
contested on evaluative grounds and, in addition, whose translation from its state domicile is 
bound to be imprecise. While some stress that part of constitutional meaning and heritage that 
is concerned with the effective operation of particular goal-orientated institutions of self-
government, others stress certain supposedly general but abstract goods of political community 
and of individual autonomy and well-being. And in either case, the analogy drawn between 
constitutional forms and norms understood and experienced as such in the national arena and 
those typically merely attributed to the transnational arena by an institutional elite and an 
academic commentariat is tendentious or awkward. The narratives constructed under the 
different strands of postnational constitutionalism, in short, tend to be highly selective, a 
function of the different focal interests of the narrators, including their different normative 
orientations, rather than of the disinterested pursuit of a comprehensive account of the global 
institutional configuration.  
We should not be naïve about this. Of course, every account of empirical phenomena 
is selective, including the account provided under the banner of contested multilateralism. Yet 
there are important differences between the explanatory credentials of an approach, such as 
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contested multilateralism, whose selectivity in finding and scrutinizing the data is purely a 
function of a prior explanatory insight into the moving forces of transnational institutional life , 
and those of an approach, such as postnational constitutionalism, whose selectivity of inquiry 
is a function of a particular and inevitably contested understanding of an appraisive concept. 
And what is not in doubt is that the perspective of contested multilateralism highlights how 
each of the three strands of postnational constitutionalism we have introduced provides an 
unhelpfully partial and skewed picture of postnational governance. 
This charge of partiality is most obviously true of the singular conception of 
postnational constitutionalism as an UN-centred hierarchy. Contested multilateralism paints a 
very different picture, much more decentred, much less organized around consensus. Yet we 
should resist the temptation to read too much into this - to see this obvious contrast as evidence 
of a fundamental irreconcilability between contested multilateralism and postnationa l 
constitutionalism. The singular conception, after all, is only one strand, even if it is the strand 
that provides the most convenient caricature of postnational hubris amongst state-centred 
transnational constitutional sceptics.  
Yet contested multilateralism is also likely to be critical of the selectivity of the other 
approaches. Postnational constitutionalism as commonality, by bracketing off institutiona l 
particularity in search of normative generality, is prone to marginalize an important dimens ion 
of power asymmetry and of conflict and contestation in postnational governance. For its part, 
postnational constitutionalism as plurality clearly has most in common with the highly 
differentiated perspective of contested multilateralism. But even here there are important areas 
of difference. Whereas the emphasis of sectoral and even societal constitutionalism tends to be 
on  the relative integrity of the parts, and on how this  both contrast with and contributes to  the 
difficulty of their combination, contested multilateralism is also closely concerned with the 
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divisions, conflicts and creative contestations  within each of the sectors. 
But if contested multilateralism offers a telling empirical critique of postnationa l 
constitutionalism, when taken further that same critique allows contested multilaterlaism to 
provide new and potentially constructive insights into some of the normative difficult ies 
associated with the constitutional project. Let us recall that postnational constitutionalism’s 
explicitly normative orientation, as well as accounting for its internal diversity and for its 
inadequacies as explanatory social science, also establishes a tension between the ideal and the 
actual that its authors struggle to accommodate. Contested multilateralism can help with this 
struggle in a number of related ways. 
To begin with, contested multilateralism offers a striking reminder of how much the 
transformation of international regimes and regime complexes remains within the agency of 
states or other actors who do not inhabit roles within existing constitutionalised frameworks of 
global governance.  Morse and Keohane, as noted, draw a distinction between state-led and 
institution- led activity in the areas of regime shifting and regime creation alike. It is already a 
helpful corrective to the widely assumed view that the progressive constitutionalisation of 
transnational governance is most likely to come from transnational sources  and to be required 
to prevail against state-centred resistance, to be reminded that individual states, and, in 
particular coalitions of states, are often behind  such new or reform initiatives. The involvement 
of many Western countries in contesting the conservative authority of the IEA in the creation 
of renewable energy sources through the creation of IRENA is a case in point, as is the authors’ 
other example of the US-led development of the Proliferation Security Initiative to overcome 
the limitations of the maritime interdiction practices available under the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.  And even when non- state-derived, a consideration of the kinds of entities 
involved shows that the impulse to change is often exogenous to the existing governance 
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complex. The global challenge to WHO on matters of vaccination, for example, was led by a 
coalition of civil society organisations, public health advocates and some parts of the vaccine 
industry. Here, indeed, Morse and Keohane’s view recalls the broader importance of bottom-
up, transnational ‘contestatory constitutionalism’ recently argued for in Global 
Constitutionalism’s own editorial pages (Tully et al, 2016).  
We should not assume, of course, that all state-led or other non-endogenous 
development of the transnational institutional complex will be in a direction that would 
generally be considered constitutionally progressive in terms of its specification and pursuit of 
public goods and its articulation of standards of open, responsive and rights-protec t ing 
government. We note, for instance, that such proposals still emanate disproportionately from 
the global North, and that powerful national interests can still be given undue prominence in 
new coalitions. Nevertheless, contested multilateralism does challenge the assumption that the 
constitutionalisation of global governance is largely an endogenous matter; and, crucially, in 
so doing it also challenges the view that the will to push in a constitutional direction lies largely 
with existing transnational institutions who often lack the capacity and broad mandate to do so 
– a view that would lead its holders to expect normative aspiration to be regularly frustrated by 
facts on the ground.   
There is, finally, a broader methodological reason why contested multilateralism offers 
some release from postnational constitutionalism’s fact-value tension. One of the particular 
ways in which the normative preoccupation of postnational constitutionalism can produce bad 
social science is by encouraging an unduly static approach to its subject-matter. On the one 
hand, as we have seen, a preoccupation with the sponsorship of key constitutional values can 
lead to institutional inattention, to an unwillingness to dwell on the detail of power relations, 
and so to a lack of curiosity over how these might be changed or changing. On the other hand, 
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for those who do put actual existing institutions front and centre, as one critic has argued, there 
is a tendency, encouraged by the perhaps wishful adoption of a constitutional mindset and a 
vision borrowed from the national stage, to overstatement - an assumption that the new 
transnational world is ‘already constituted, structured, governed’ and that ‘we simply lack the 
vision to understand how it works.’ (Kennedy, 2009: 39).  
What is missing from both these approaches is a sense of constitutional dynamics - a 
diachronic analysis to supplement the freeze-frame picture. With its conception of change 
through creative disruption, contested multilateralism reminds us of this more dynamic 
approach. In so doing, it provides us with one way of imagining and plotting the kind of 
developments that might provoke the movement of the constitutional actual in the direction of 
the ideal, rather than simply producing an idealized picture of the actual. 
 Contested multilateralism, in conclusion, remains a concept under construction, and so 
one that may lack the detailed specification for sophisticated causal theorization. It too, 
therefore, may not - or may not yet - provide the best social science.   But it is precisely the 
broad sweep of its initial message that offers something interesting and challenging to the 
multiverse of contemporary postnational constitutionalism.  
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